By Alex Ter Adum
Lula’s historic comeback offers Nigeria a lesson in sovereignty, economic hardship, policy alternatives and the power of opposition unity.
On 25 October 2026, Brazil delivered a consequential message about democracy, incumbency and the power of voters to determine their country’s future. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, to secure an unprecedented fourth presidential term.
The significance of the result lies not merely in Lula’s victory but in how he achieved it. Flávio had finished ahead of Lula in the first round on 4 October. Yet Lula overturned that deficit in the runoff, winning 51.79% of valid votes against Flávio’s 48.21%.
The Brazilian election is an important mirror for Nigeria as the country approaches its 2027 presidential election. Although the two countries differ in their political institutions, economic circumstances and electoral histories, both face questions about the consequences of economic policies, the limits of incumbency and the ability of opposition forces to mobilise voters around an alternative vision.
Brazil has also demonstrated that an incumbent’s political advantages do not guarantee victory, that a first-round lead is not a final verdict, and that determined electoral mobilisation can change the direction of a contest.
These are lessons that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the APC and Nigeria’s opposition should take seriously.
BRAZIL’S MESSAGE: INCUMBENCY IS NOT OWNERSHIP
Lula’s victory followed a deeply polarised contest involving economic policy, social welfare, democratic institutions, public security and Brazil’s international relationships.
His political appeal rested partly on social protection, support for poorer households and the promise that economic development should improve ordinary citizens’ lives. His victory over Flávio Bolsonaro demonstrated that voters retain the authority to reassess their choices, even after an incumbent or political movement appears to have gained the advantage.
The lesson is not that every Brazilian endorsed every aspect of Lula’s record. It is that the electorate ultimately decides which political direction it considers preferable.
For Nigeria, the parallel is compelling. Tinubu and the APC may enjoy the advantages of incumbency with over 32 governors and a legion of elected public officials, access to state resources and institutions and relationships with powerful foreign governments. But none of these automatically translates into popular consent.
The central question is whether the administration can persuade ordinary Nigerians that their material circumstances have improved sufficiently to justify another mandate, or whether voters will seek a different economic and political direction.
TINUBU, APC AND THE HUMAN COST OF ECONOMIC REFORMS
The APC and President Tinubu approaches the 2027 election amid continuing controversy over the consequences of his administration’s economic policies.
The badly sequenced removal of petrol subsidies, exchange-rate reforms and other fiscal adjustments have been defended as necessary measures to correct structural weaknesses, eliminate market distortions and improve public finances.
But a reform must ultimately be judged by its results, not merely by the intentions used to justify it.
Nigerians continue to confront high food prices, expensive transportation, rising production costs, inadequate electricity, unemployment, insecurity and mounting pressure on household incomes. Many businesses struggle to absorb the costs of energy, logistics and imported inputs, while ordinary families face difficult choices over food, healthcare, education and other essentials.
The government points to increased revenue collections, improved foreign-exchange conditions, purported investment inflows and marginal GDP growth indicators as evidence that its policies are beginning to work. Those indicators deserve consideration, but they cannot by themselves settle the argument.
The fundamental question is whether improvements in macroeconomic indicators are translating into meaningful relief for the wider population.
An economy cannot be declared a success merely because government revenue increases while households and businesses struggle to afford the basic inputs of everyday life, like food, medicine, shelter and security of lives and property.
The purpose of economic reform is to improve economic performance and human welfare. This is also consistent with section 14(2) of Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, which makes the welfare and the protection of lives and properties of the citizens the primary responsibility of government.
When the implementation of a policy produces consequences that undermine its stated objectives and negates the clear provisions of section 14(1), responsible leadership requires a willingness to correct the policy rather than defend it indefinitely.
This is where the argument for an alternative economic direction for Nigeria in 2027 becomes particularly important.
FOREIGN APPROVAL RATINGS CANNOT REPLACE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Another important issue is whether Nigeria’s engagement with powerful foreign governments consistently advances the country’s long-term interests.
The United States, Britain, France and other European countries pursue policies designed to advance their strategic, commercial and industrial objectives. Nigeria must also approach these relationships with equal clarity and determination.
The controversy surrounding Nigeria’s health cooperation agreement with the United States illustrates the importance of transparency. Ghana raised concerns about provisions in a proposed American health arrangement, particularly regarding sensitive health information and regulatory safeguards. Nigeria subsequently signed the same agreement with Washington. I concede the two agreements may not contain identical provisions, but Nigerians are entitled to understand the terms of their own agreement, just the same way Ghana was open and transparent about it.
The British-backed financing arrangement for the reconstruction of the Apapa and Tin Can Island port complexes raises related questions about borrowing costs, procurement conditions and the distribution of economic benefits. British disclosures identified substantial opportunities for British suppliers, including British Steel. Nigeria must demonstrate that the financing terms offer value for money and that domestic industry receives meaningful opportunities.
Strategic-resource agreements deserve equally rigorous scrutiny. Where mineral concession agreement, tax administration arrangements or other economic partnerships are opaquely crafted and gifted to the United States of America and France without public debate by the people and their representatives at the National Assembly, it leaves sour taste. Most especially, where such arrangements are routinely criticised by local and international commentators as excessively favourable to external interests, the government should disclose the relevant terms and explain their implications for revenue, employment, technology transfer and national security.
The existence of a foreign agreement does not, by itself, establish that Nigeria’s sovereignty has been compromised. But neither should diplomatic prestige or the promise of investment or regime protection be used to shield consequential agreements from public scrutiny.
Nigeria needs foreign investment, technology and international partnerships. What it must avoid is a relationship in which external interests appear to receive clearer protection than Nigeria’s own productive capacity and long-term development.
Foreign partnerships should strengthen Nigeria’s sovereignty, not diminish its ability to make independent economic choices. A president’s international standing is not a substitute for accountability at home.
A president’s past criminal records in a foreign country that makes him a “strategic asset” should also not be used as a weapon against the sovereignty of the country. This is why Nigeria must not only revisit the drug trafficking investigation controversies sorrounding president Tinubu in America in 2027, but decisively put an end to it through the ballot.
THE GREEN PASSPORT AND THE DUTY TO PROTECT NIGERIANS
The same principle applies to foreign policy.
Nigerians have faced killings, xenophobic hostility and other attacks in South Africa. Nigerian authorities have issued condemnations and demanded accountability, but the persistence of such incidents raises questions about the effectiveness of diplomatic protection and the practical consequences of diplomatic engagement.
Foreign policy cannot be measured solely by presidential visits, international conferences and agreements signed with powerful governments. It must also be judged by whether Nigerian citizens receive effective consular assistance, whether attacks are investigated, whether perpetrators face accountability and whether diplomacy produces measurable improvements.
The green passport should represent citizenship backed by a government that takes the safety and dignity of Nigerians seriously wherever they live.
Nigeria must maintain constructive international relationships, but those relationships should be built on mutual respect, reciprocity and the willingness to defend Nigerian interests firmly.
ATIKU ABUBAKAR: THE CASE FOR REFORMING FAILED REFORMS
Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar offers a decisive alternative to the Tinubu administration in 2027, particularly in the areas of economic restructuring, petroleum-sector reform and the cost of living.
The comparison with Lula is not exact. Lula was an incumbent who recovered from a first-round deficit, while Atiku is a former vice president seeking to unseat an incumbent. Their political circumstances differ, but the broader lesson is relevant: a credible alternative can become competitive when voters are persuaded that a different direction offers a better prospect for their future.
Atiku’s economic argument is especially significant because it challenges the assumption that once a reform has been introduced, its architecture must remain untouched regardless of its consequences.
Reforms are instruments for achieving results, not articles of faith. When their implementation becomes counterproductive to their stated objectives, the answer is to reform the reforms.
The removal of petrol subsidies was justified as a way to eliminate fiscal waste, free public resources and create a more efficient petroleum market. Yet the resulting increase in fuel costs has contributed to higher transportation and production expenses, placing additional pressure on food prices, household budgets and businesses.
If the intention was to improve economic efficiency and living standards, the question must be asked: what is the justification for preserving a policy framework without adequately addressing the hardship it has helped produce?
Atiku’s proposal to redirect subsidy support towards domestic refining and verified local petroleum supply offers a different approach. Instead of allowing support to be associated principally with imported petroleum products, the proposal seeks to connect assistance to domestic production, local refining and the supply of petroleum products to the Nigerian market.
Properly designed, transparently administered and subject to strict fiscal limits, independent verification and enforceable delivery obligations, such a framework could support domestic refining while helping to reduce the costs that flow through transportation, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce.
It would not eliminate every cause of inflation, nor would it automatically guarantee a comprehensive resolution of the cost of living crisis without more, but it would push fuel prices down significantly. Overall, its effectiveness would depend on the pricing formula, the scale and cost of the intervention, refinery performance, market competition and the extent to which savings reach consumers. But these are reasons to refine and test the policy carefully, not reasons to dismiss the possibility of a better-designed alternative as it is done by Bola Tinubu and his administration.
Nigeria is an oil-producing country with growing domestic refining capacity. The strategic objective should be to convert that resource advantage into affordable energy, industrial development, employment and improved purchasing power. No other counter argument supervedes this objective.
The same principle should guide other economic policies. Where a reform increases revenue but imposes severe costs on households, government should examine how those costs can be reduced. Where exchange-rate adjustments create new opportunities but also raise the cost of essential inputs, complementary measures should protect production and vulnerable consumers. Where fiscal consolidation is necessary, it should be accompanied by credible plans to improve public services and relieve the pressure on ordinary citizens.
The choice before Nigerians is not between reform and no reform. It is between policies that are defended regardless of their consequences and policies that can be corrected, improved and redesigned to deliver better results.
Atiku’s prescriptions deserve serious consideration because they place that distinction at the centre of the economic debate. His proposed approach offers Nigerians a reason to consider a different direction in 2027—not simply because it is different, but because it seeks to address the counterproductive outcomes of existing policies.
For millions of Nigerians struggling with the cost of living, the possibility of “Making Nigeria More Affordable Again” is not an abstract campaign slogan. It is a practical question of whether transport, food, energy, healthcare and productive enterprise can become more accessible.
That is why Atiku’s policy alternatives are worth a serious bet in 2027. They provide a basis for challenging the assumption that Nigerians must indefinitely endure the consequences of policies that have not delivered the relief they were expected to produce.
THE REAL LESSON OF 25 OCTOBER: POLITICAL MOMENTUM CAN CHANGE
Brazil’s runoff offers another lesson for Nigeria: elections are dynamic contests, and political momentum is never guaranteed.
Flávio Bolsonaro entered the runoff after finishing ahead in the first round. Lula’s campaign subsequently recovered ground and overturned that lead.
The result illustrates the importance of voter mobilisation, campaign organisation, coalition-building and the ability to address voters’ concerns. It also demonstrates why early leads, elite endorsements and apparent political dominance should not be mistaken for guaranteed victory.
For Nigeria’s opposition, this lesson should be taken particularly seriously.
The opposition cannot afford to rely solely on public dissatisfaction with the APC. Economic hardship may create an opening for change, but that opening must be translated into electoral support through credible policies, grassroots organisation, voter engagement and effective coordination.
Atiku’s economic message can provide an important foundation for that effort. But its political effectiveness will depend partly on the opposition’s ability to build a broad coalition around an agreed programme for economic recovery, national sovereignty, accountable government and credible elections.
The objective must be to persuade Nigerians that a change of government would mean a change in the direction of public policy, not merely a change in the occupants of political offices.
JANUARY 2027: THE OPPOSITION MUST UNITE TO WIN
Brazil’s election should not be treated as a prophecy of Nigeria’s political future. It should be understood as a demonstration that the outcome of a closely contested election can change dramatically when political forces mobilise effectively and voters are presented with a compelling alternative.
Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election will depend on its own candidates, electoral institutions, political alignments and electorate. But if the contest produces a runoff, as happened in Brazil, the opposition must be prepared to respond with unity rather than fragmentation.
The opposition must not allow personal ambition, party labels or disagreements over individual candidates to become instruments of collective defeat. If no candidate secures the required constitutional threshold in the first round, opposition parties and leaders must be prepared to negotiate a common position, rally behind the strongest viable alternative and mobilise their supporters around an agreed programme for national recovery.
Such unity must be built on clear commitments: economic policies that address the cost of living, reforms that strengthen domestic production, transparent management of national resources, protection of civil liberties, credible electoral institutions and a government accountable to the people.
Atiku’s proposed economic alternatives provide a substantive basis around which such a coalition could organise, while the wider opposition must demonstrate that it is prepared to place the national interest above narrow partisan calculations.
Brazil has shown that a first-round lead does not settle an election and that an organised campaign can overturn an apparent advantage. Nigeria’s opposition should learn from that experience now, not after the opportunity has passed.
The APC must defend its record before the electorate. Atiku and the opposition must present a credible alternative. And if a runoff becomes necessary, they must not squander the opportunity through division.
Nigeria is not the property of its incumbent president. Our national resources must serve our people, our economy must work for ordinary Nigerians, and our democracy must remain in the hands of the Nigerian people.
The task before the opposition is therefore clear: organise, unite around a credible programme, protect every lawful vote and be prepared to work together if a runoff becomes necessary. The ultimate decision belongs to Nigerians, but the opposition must ensure that division does not prevent their collective aspirations from finding effective democratic expression.
OUR COUNTRY IS NOT FOR SALE. OUR ECONOMY MUST WORK FOR OUR PEOPLE. AND WHERE THE PEOPLE DEMAND CHANGE, THE OPPOSITION MUST BE UNITED AROUND A POLICY CONVERSATION NOT MUNDANE SENTIMENTS TO MAKE THAT CHANGE POSSIBLE.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD
DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE
#NigeriaIsNotForSale #NationalInterestFirst #MakeNigeriaAffordableAgain #OppositionUnity #DemocracyBelongsToThePeople #Nigeria2027
