By Alex Ter Adum, PhD
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has attempted, through a press statement, to justify its unilateral freezing of the bank accounts of the Osun State Government.
Regrettably, the statement is long on rhetoric but short on constitutional and legal authority. Public relations cannot substitute for the rule of law.
No one disputes the statutory mandate of the EFCC to investigate allegations of economic and financial crimes.
However, the Commission’s investigative powers do not translate into a constitutional licence to cripple the financial operations of a federating State by administrative fiat. Nigeria is a federation, not a unitary state. Osun State is not a department of the Federal Government, and its treasury is not subject to the unilateral control of any federal agency.
The EFCC admits that it commenced investigations in March 2026 but chose to freeze the State’s accounts only days before a governorship election.
If the alleged infractions had been under investigation for months, what exceptional circumstance justified such a drastic action at the most politically sensitive moment? That sequence of events inevitably raises legitimate constitutional concerns about proportionality, abuse of power, and the possible impact on the electoral process.
More fundamentally, the Commission’s statement fails to identify the legal authority empowering it to impose a Post No Debit order on the accounts of a constitutionally established State Government without prior judicial authorisation.
Allegations of suspicious transactions, however grave, do not confer on the EFCC the power to suspend the constitutional functions of a State. The Constitution guarantees due process, not executive convenience or fiat.
Sections 120 to 125 of the Constitution establish the legal framework for the custody, appropriation, auditing and accountability of State finances.
Section 162 further guarantees the constitutional allocation of public funds to the States. These provisions recognise the fiscal autonomy of the States within Nigeria’s federal structure.
Any action that effectively paralyses the financial machinery of a State must be founded upon clear constitutional and judicial authority, not merely the administrative discretion of an investigating agency.
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the autonomy of the States and the constitutional limits on federal interference. In Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors. v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264 and Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1 , the Court underscored that federal institutions cannot, under the guise of statutory powers, undermine the constitutional independence of State Governments.
The EFCC’s claim that it acted to “save public funds from being looted” is not a legal justification; it is a conclusion that only a competent court can ultimately reach. In a constitutional democracy, suspicion is not guilt, investigation is not conviction, and administrative suspicion cannot become a substitute for judicial determination.
Even more troubling is the Commission’s assertion that other States are also “on its investigative radar.” That declaration may have been intended to demonstrate impartiality, but it instead reinforces the disturbing impression that the EFCC sees itself as a supervisory authority over the finances of elected State Governments. It is not.
The Commission is an investigative and prosecutorial agency, not a constitutional auditor-general of the Federation.
If the EFCC possessed credible evidence that public funds were about to be dissipated, the lawful course was clear: approach a competent court, present the evidence, and obtain appropriate preservatory orders. That is the essence of due process.
What the Constitution does not permit is for an agency of the Executive to unilaterally immobilise the finances of a State Government and thereafter seek validation through a press release.
Ultimately, the issue is not whether corruption should be fought. It must be fought relentlessly. The issue is whether the fight against corruption will itself remain subject to the Constitution. The answer must be an unequivocal yes. No agency, however well-intentioned, is above the Constitution, and no anti-corruption objective justifies the erosion of federalism, due process, and the rule of law.
The EFCC’s statement therefore fails to answer the central constitutional question: by what legal authority did it, without a prior order of a competent court, freeze the accounts of a sovereign federating State? Until that question is answered with reference to the Constitution and the law, not rhetoric, the Commission’s action remains legally non-sequitur and constitutionally indefensible.
