A Rejoinder to Olukayode Ajulo’s intervention on Festus Adedayo’s article, “Atiku, Tinubu, Justice Lifu and the Death of Àà tíí gbọ́?”
By Alex Ter Adum, PhD
Olukayode Ajulo’s intervention, presented as a defence of intellectual honesty, constitutionalism and judicial independence, is itself a selective interpretation of the facts. While invoking the respectable principles of judicial independence, presumption of regularity and the distinction between separate proceedings, he conveniently avoids the most troubling questions arising from the ADC litigation.
His central argument is that Justice Peter Lifu’s judgment must be understood independently of Justice Musa Liman’s earlier judgment because the two proceedings were different suits. He further argues that the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court possesses administrative discretion to assign cases and that allegations of presidential interference cannot be sustained by political suspicion.
These arguments are attractive in their abstract formulation. Unfortunately, they do not adequately address the actual circumstances of this controversy.
The issue is not whether different suits can arise from the same subject matter. Of course, they can. The issue is whether a litigant can circumvent an existing judicial determination by commencing another proceeding, potentially through a different claimant, seeking to reopen questions already determined between the same parties or their privies, and whether another judge of coordinate jurisdiction can make orders that effectively undermine an existing judgment without confronting its legal consequences.
Ajulo has not satisfactorily answered that question.
DIFFERENT SUITS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY EXTINGUISH THE EFFECT OF AN EARLIER JUDGMENT
Let us examine the argument about Justice Liman and Justice Lifu.
Justice Liman delivered judgment on 2 July 2026 in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1637/2025, involving Hon. Leke Abejide and the ADC leadership dispute.
Justice Lifu subsequently delivered judgment on 5 November 2026 in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1819/2025, instituted by Nafiu Bala Gombe.
Ajulo appears to believe that identifying different suit numbers and different originating claimants sufficiently disposes of the controversy.
That is an incomplete statement of the law.
The doctrine of res judicata requires examination of the identity of parties or their privies, the subject matter, the issues determined, the finality of the earlier decision and the competence of the court that delivered it. Issue estoppel similarly prevents the re-litigation of an issue conclusively determined between the same parties or their privies.
The Supreme Court explained these principles in Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC 219 and Ben Ikpang v. Chief Sam Edoho (1978) 2 LRN 152.
The critical question is therefore not simply whether the two suits have different numbers or were instituted by different individuals. It is whether the parties were litigating in the same capacity, whether there was a representative or privy relationship, and whether the material questions and rights determined in the earlier proceedings were being reopened in the subsequent proceedings.
Indeed, in the circumstances of the ADC dispute, the relationship between the litigants cannot be examined merely by looking at the names appearing on the originating processes.
The political and representative relationship between the claimants, the leadership factions and the interests they advanced must also be examined. Where the evidence establishes that individuals were acting together, advancing the same interests and litigating in a representative capacity, the law does not permit the doctrine of privity to be defeated by changing the name on the originating summons.
It is equally important to distinguish between cause-of-action estoppel and issue estoppel. The fact that the causes of action are differently formulated does not necessarily mean that every issue determined in the earlier proceedings is available for reconsideration.
Consequently, Ajulo’s argument that the proceedings were different does not answer the question of whether the earlier judgment created an estoppel or whether the subsequent judgment contradicted an existing judicial determination.
There is, however, an important qualification. A judgment of a court of coordinate jurisdiction is not binding on another judge as a precedent in the same way that a decision of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court is binding. Nor does every earlier judgment concerning the same subject matter automatically create res judicata.
But where the earlier judgment has established rights or conclusively determined issues between the same parties or their privies, its estoppel effect cannot simply be ignored.
The distinction is fundamental. And Ajulo missed that or conveniently ignored it.
WAS JUSTICE LIFU REQUIRED TO CONFRONT THE LIMAN JUDGMENT?
This is where Ajulo’s analysis becomes particularly inadequate.
The fact that Justice Liman’s judgment was delivered in a different suit does not make it legally irrelevant.
It is true that a court does not automatically take judicial notice of every judgment delivered by another court. A party relying on a previous judgment as constituting res judicata or issue estoppel must properly raise the plea, plead the relevant facts and place the judgment and necessary proceedings before the court.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Michael Ezenwa v. I.O. Olalekan Kareem (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 258 illustrates the importance of properly placing the earlier proceedings and judgment before the trial court.
But this procedural requirement does not confer permission on a subsequent judge to disregard a judgment that has properly been brought to his attention.
Once the earlier judgment is properly placed before the court, the judge must examine its legal effect. He may distinguish it, find that the parties or issues are different, determine that the requirements of estoppel have not been established, or explain why the subsequent proceedings raise genuinely distinct questions.
What he cannot properly do is proceed as though the earlier judgment does not exist when its legal consequences have been squarely raised.
This is precisely the distinction Ajulo avoids.
The complaint is not simply that Justice Lifu was required to adopt Justice Liman’s reasoning. It is that he was required to confront the legal implications of an existing judgment concerning the same ADC leadership controversy before making consequential orders capable of overturning the established administrative and political position of the party.
The distinction between not being bound by another judge’s reasoning as precedent and being bound to respect the legal consequences of an existing judgment is not a matter of semantics. It is central to the administration of justice.
Ajulo should address that distinction rather than hide behind the different suit numbers.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF JUDGE IS NOT AN ANSWER TO A PATTERN OF QUESTIONABLE CASE ASSIGNMENTS
Ajulo’s defence of the Chief Judge, Justice John Tsoho, is perhaps the most revealing part of his intervention.
He argues that the Chief Judge has administrative responsibilities, including the assignment and reassignment of cases, and that the exercise of such responsibilities does not establish ulterior motives.
Nobody disputes that proposition.
The Chief Judge has legitimate administrative powers. But administrative discretion is not an unrestricted licence. It must be exercised lawfully, transparently, consistently and in accordance with the institutional obligations of judicial independence and impartiality.
The relevant question is whether those powers were exercised in a manner that inspires public confidence in the impartial administration of justice.
In the ADC controversy, the circumstances surrounding the reassignment of Nafiu Bala’s case from Justice Emeka Nwite to Justice Peter Lifu deserve serious scrutiny.
The case had originally been before Justice Nwite. Following an interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court, on 30 April 2026, remitted the proceedings to the Federal High Court for continuation and accelerated determination.
When the case returned, Justice Nwite adjourned proceedings while issues surrounding a request for reassignment and the production of the Supreme Court’s certified judgment were being addressed.
Thereafter, the Chief Judge reassigned the matter to Justice Lifu.
This reassignment generated formal complaints and litigation. ADC National Welfare Secretary Nkemakolam Ukandu instituted Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1165/2026, challenging the administrative handling of the matter and seeking an investigation by the National Judicial Council.
The question raised was not whether the Chief Judge possessed administrative powers in the abstract. It was whether those powers were exercised consistently with the circumstances of the Supreme Court’s remittal, the proceedings before Justice Nwite and the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Ajulo simply tells us that the Chief Judge had discretion.
That is not an answer to the complaint.
A discretion can exist and still be exercised improperly. An administrative decision can be formally within the powers of an officeholder and nevertheless raise legitimate questions about its propriety, transparency and fairness.
The fact that Justice Nwite was subsequently elevated to the Court of Appeal is also relevant to the administrative explanation for redistribution. It does not, however, extinguish the need to examine the circumstances, sequence and manner of reassignment. Because as it is today, even after the elevation, Justice Emeka Nwite is still presiding over cases at the Federal High Court because he is yet to be sworn in as a justice of the Court of Appeal. So while elevation is a plausible answer, the reality is that it does not provide a satisfactory answer.
THE CONCERNS ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF POLITICAL CASES ARE NOT INVENTED
There have been recurring complaints from political parties and litigants concerning the handling and assignment of politically consequential proceedings within the Abuja division of the Federal High Court.
The names of Justices Peter Lifu, Emeka Nwite and Joyce Abdulmalik have featured in different controversies involving opposition political parties and their internal disputes.
The PDP, for instance, publicly complained that its earlier concerns about the impartiality of certain judges had not been given adequate consideration when a case involving its leadership and secretariat was assigned to Justice Joyce Abdulmalik. The party subsequently announced its withdrawal of a case and referred to an earlier complaint to the Chief Judge and an application for recusal.
Similarly, the ADC’s complaints concerning Justice Lifu and the reassignment of the Nafiu Bala proceedings were formally taken beyond public commentary into petitions and court processes.
These complaints do not, by themselves, establish that any judge is corrupt or that the Chief Judge deliberately assigns cases to achieve predetermined political outcomes.
But they are relevant to the question of institutional confidence.
Ajulo’s mistake is to treat each complaint as an isolated political grievance and then use the general existence of administrative discretion to dismiss the cumulative concern.
That is not a serious institutional assessment.
Where complaints recur, where different political parties raise questions about judicial impartiality, and where politically sensitive cases repeatedly become the subject of controversy surrounding their assignment and handling, the proper response is institutional transparency, not rhetorical dismissal.
The judiciary must not only be independent. It must be seen to be independent.
A judicial institution that insists on public confidence cannot simultaneously demand that citizens ignore every circumstance capable of reasonably undermining that confidence.
JUSTICE LIFU’S PREVIOUS APPELLATE HISTORY CANNOT BE ERASED FROM THIS DISCUSSION
Ajulo’s attempt to portray criticism of Justice Lifu as an assault on judicial independence is particularly difficult to reconcile with the public record of appellate criticism of the judge.
Consider the proceedings concerning the attempted deregistration of the ADC, Action Peoples Party, Action Alliance, Accord Party and Zenith Labour Party.
Justice Lifu delivered judgment directing the deregistration of the affected political parties.
The parties appealed. The Court of Appeal subsequently intervened, first staying the execution of the judgment and later setting aside the deregistration decision.
More significantly, the Court of Appeal criticised Justice Lifu for proceeding with the matter despite an earlier order directing a stay of proceedings.
The appellate court described his conduct as a form of judicial impertinence and referred to judicial rascality, invoking the established principle that a judicial officer who deliberately disregards a superior court’s order is unfit for the bench.
These were not insults manufactured by political commentators. They were expressions contained in the appellate court’s judicial assessment of his conduct.
The distinction matters.
Nobody is suggesting that every judgment subsequently overturned on appeal establishes judicial misconduct. Appellate courts routinely correct errors made by trial courts.
But where an appellate court expressly condemns a judge’s conduct for disregarding a subsisting order of a superior court, that judicial history becomes relevant when evaluating subsequent concerns about the same judge’s handling of politically consequential proceedings.
Ajulo cannot demand that citizens forget this history in the name of judicial independence.
Judicial independence protects judges from improper interference. It does not confer immunity from legitimate scrutiny of their judicial conduct.
Indeed, the independence of the judiciary is strengthened, not weakened, when judges are held accountable to the hierarchy of courts and the constitutional discipline governing judicial office.
THE RECUSAL APPLICATIONS AND PETITIONS WERE NOT IMAGINARY POLITICAL INVENTIONS
Another significant omission in Ajulo’s intervention concerns the formal objections to Justice Lifu’s continued participation in the ADC proceedings.
The ADC and Rauf Aregbesola sought his recusal. Applications were filed requesting that he withdraw from the proceedings and that the matter be returned to the Chief Judge for reassignment.
There were also petitions and complaints directed at the judicial administration, including allegations of bias and concerns about the handling of the proceedings.
Justice Lifu dismissed the recusal applications and imposed fines of ₦500,000 each on the ADC and Aregbesola.
For accuracy, therefore, it would be wrong to say that the applications were never judicially considered. They were considered and dismissed.
But that is not the end of the matter.
The question is whether the circumstances giving rise to the applications were properly addressed and whether the judge’s continued participation was consistent with the objective standard of impartiality.
The law does not require a litigant to establish actual personal animosity before raising a legitimate concern about apparent bias. The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer, considering the relevant circumstances, would apprehend a real possibility of bias.
This is a question of public confidence in the administration of justice, not merely the subjective satisfaction of the judge concerned.
A judge’s refusal to recuse himself does not automatically resolve the underlying question of apparent bias.
Ajulo should therefore explain why the history of complaints, the circumstances of reassignment, the earlier appellate criticism and the subsequent conduct of the proceedings should not be considered cumulatively.
Simply saying that the applications lacked merit because the judge said so is not an adequate answer.
FESTUS ADEDAYO’S SUSPICION ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY HAS A DOCUMENTED POLITICAL CONTEXT
Perhaps the most disingenuous part of Ajulo’s intervention is his suggestion that attributing political responsibility to the Tinubu administration is simply a convenient conspiracy narrative.
Festus Adedayo did not develop his suspicion in a political vacuum.
There is a documented history of public statements and conduct by senior figures within the Tinubu administration that provides context for citizens’ concerns about the destabilisation of opposition parties.
Consider the statement attributed to the President’s Chief of Staff, Femi Gbajabiamila, in April 2026, during an interaction with Hon. Leke Abejide, a prominent participant in the ADC leadership dispute.
Gbajabiamila was captured in a widely circulated video encouraging Abejide to remain in the ADC, fight the opposing faction and scatter it.
The reported words were:
“Stay in that same ADC. Fight them. Scatter them! Hold on to your party, ADC. Do not abandon them. We like what you are doing.”
He also reportedly encouraged Abejide to bring Bala Gombe into the arrangement and assured him of support, adding, “Good luck in court.”
Let us pause and consider the significance of those remarks.
The Chief of Staff to the President is not an ordinary partisan commentator. He is a senior official within the Presidency, occupying an office at the centre of the President’s political and administrative machinery.
When such an official publicly encourages one faction in an opposition party to remain inside the party, fight its rival, scatter the opposing structure and pursue the matter in court, Nigerians are entitled to ask what precisely the Presidency means by its support.
Is this the language of a neutral government committed to protecting multiparty democracy, or the language of a political establishment actively interested in the internal destabilisation of an opposition party?
Ajulo cannot reasonably dismiss the concern as a conspiracy theory without addressing this public record.
The controversy was sufficiently serious to attract public condemnation from former APC Deputy National Publicity Secretary Timi Frank and other political actors.
The ADC National Legislators Forum also publicly raised concerns about the implications of the Chief of Staff’s reported remarks.
These are verifiable political developments, not inventions of Festus Adedayo.
THE REMARKS OF FESTUS KEYAMO AND NYESOM WIKE REINFORCE THE CONCERNS
The Chief of Staff’s remarks are not the only reason citizens have become suspicious of the political environment surrounding the opposition.
Consider the public statements of the Minister of Aviation and Aerospace Development, Festus Keyamo, following Justice Lifu’s judgment.
Keyamo publicly declared that the ADC would be on the ballot but that the candidates produced by the David Mark-led faction, including Atiku Abubakar, might not be.
He subsequently argued that there was nothing inherently wrong with the possibility of Atiku being excluded from the ballot.
Of course, a minister is entitled to express a legal opinion. Keyamo is also a senior lawyer and a prominent APC politician.
But the political significance of his comments cannot be divorced from his position in the administration and the fact that the judgment had just delivered a devastating blow to the opposition party’s electoral structure.
The timing and certainty of the minister’s political interpretation, before the appellate process had run its course, were bound to attract scrutiny.
Then consider the repeated public remarks of the FCT Minister, Nyesom Wike, concerning the opposition.
Wike has openly declared that Nigeria has no formidable opposition, described the opposition’s political prospects dismissively and stated that his political assignment includes giving Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi political headaches.
In August 2026, he was reported as saying that his job was to give the opposition leaders high blood pressure.
These remarks may be defended as ordinary political banter. But coming from a serving minister, they reinforce the impression of an administration whose leading political figures are openly invested in the weakening of the opposition.
There is also the President’s own political rhetoric.
On 6 November 2026, during his visit to Akwa Ibom State, President Tinubu publicly attacked the political credentials of Peter Obi and Atiku Abubakar, questioned Atiku’s defection to the ADC and described the opposition political arrangement in dismissive terms.
A President is entitled to defend his record and criticise his political opponents. That is part of democratic politics.
But a President must also appreciate that the language and conduct of his administration’s senior officials have institutional consequences, particularly when the country is witnessing a series of legal and political developments capable of affecting the ability of opposition parties to participate effectively in an election.
The cumulative effect of these statements cannot simply be wished away.
The issue is not whether any one of these statements independently proves that the President procured Justice Lifu’s judgment. They do not.
The issue is whether they provide a reasonable foundation for public concern about the administration’s attitude towards the opposition and the preservation of competitive multiparty democracy.
The answer is undoubtedly yes.
POLITICAL SUSPICION IS NOT THE SAME THING AS A JUDICIAL FINDING OF CONSPIRACY
There is an important distinction that must be maintained.
Festus Adedayo’s argument is fundamentally an assessment of political circumstances, public conduct and the implications of recent developments.
It is not necessary to establish, as a criminal prosecution would require, that President Tinubu personally instructed a judge to deliver a particular judgment before citizens can question whether the overall political environment is hostile to opposition parties.
Political accountability and criminal proof operate at different levels.
A journalist can reasonably identify a pattern of conduct, draw an inference and question its implications without claiming to possess direct evidence of a secret agreement.
Of course, it would be wrong to present presidential orchestration of a judgment as an established fact without evidence.
But it is equally wrong to suggest that political suspicion is devoid of foundation merely because no one has produced a written presidential instruction to a judge.
The public is entitled to evaluate the totality of the circumstances: the remarks of the Chief of Staff, the comments of the FCT Minister, the statements of the Aviation Minister, the President’s own political rhetoric, the sequence of judicial developments and the resulting consequences for the opposition.
Ajulo’s argument effectively demands that citizens compartmentalise every event and refuse to examine the cumulative picture.
That is not intellectual honesty. It is an artificially narrow approach to political accountability.
AJULO’S DEFENCE OF THE PRESIDENCY IS A POLITICAL WHITEWASH DISGUISED AS A LEGAL ASSESSMENT
What is particularly striking about Ajulo’s intervention is its selective application of the presumption of regularity.
He readily invokes that presumption in defence of the Chief Judge’s administrative decisions and Justice Lifu’s judicial conduct.
Yet the same generosity is not extended to the legitimate concerns of opposition politicians and citizens who question the circumstances surrounding those decisions.
He tells us that the Chief Judge should be presumed to have acted regularly because he possesses administrative powers.
He tells us that Justice Lifu should not be criticised because judges are entitled to judicial independence.
He tells us that the Presidency should not be suspected because direct proof of executive interference has not been established.
But what about the people who petitioned the judicial authorities? What about the parties who formally sought recusal? What about the appellate court’s condemnation of Justice Lifu’s earlier conduct? What about the Chief of Staff’s publicly reported encouragement to scatter the ADC? What about the political statements of the FCT Minister and the Aviation Minister?
Why are these facts treated as irrelevant or insufficient even for purposes of reasonable public suspicion?
Ajulo’s intervention is therefore not the neutral constitutional assessment it purports to be.
It is a defence constructed by isolating each troubling development from the larger political and institutional context in which it occurred.
That is the very selectivity he accuses Festus Adedayo of displaying.
THE REAL QUESTION IS THE SURVIVAL OF MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY
Nobody is suggesting that Atiku Abubakar should be exempted from the law because he is a former Vice-President or a presidential aspirant.
Nobody is suggesting that the ADC should be permitted to disregard its constitution or the Electoral Act.
Nobody is arguing that the courts should automatically endorse the decisions of the David Mark-led leadership.
The question is whether the law is being applied consistently and impartially, whether judicial processes are being used to resolve genuine disputes or are producing disproportionate consequences, and whether the political environment is increasingly hostile to the survival of a credible opposition.
The judgment of Justice Lifu did not merely resolve a narrow disagreement about the tenure of an individual party officer. Its consequential orders affected the Mark-led leadership, the party’s internal decisions and the validity of the candidates produced under that leadership, including Atiku Abubakar.
The potential consequences extend to hundreds of other candidates and the democratic choices available to Nigerian voters.
Such a judgment deserves the most rigorous legal and institutional scrutiny.
The right to political participation is not a personal privilege belonging to Atiku. It is a constitutional right enjoyed by Nigerians and political parties within the framework of the Constitution and electoral laws.
A democracy cannot be healthy when the opposition’s ability to organise, contest and present candidates is repeatedly threatened by political manoeuvres, internal factional disputes and judicial decisions with far-reaching consequences.
And it is precisely because the stakes are so high that judicial officers must exercise exceptional care in proceedings capable of altering the political landscape.
CONCLUSION: INTELLECTUAL HONESTY MUST NOT BECOME A CONVENIENT SHIELD FOR INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
Olukayode Ajulo is entitled to disagree with Festus Adedayo. He is entitled to defend the Chief Judge’s administrative authority and to argue that Justice Lifu’s judgment should be tested through the appellate process.
But he cannot reasonably demand intellectual honesty from others while avoiding the most inconvenient facts in the controversy.
Different suit numbers do not automatically defeat res judicata or issue estoppel. Administrative discretion does not automatically establish the propriety of every case assignment. A judge’s refusal to recuse himself does not conclusively answer every legitimate question about apparent bias. And the absence of direct proof of presidential instructions does not render the public’s suspicion of executive hostility towards the opposition irrational.
Most importantly, the appellate condemnation of Justice Lifu’s conduct in the deregistration proceedings is part of the public judicial record. It cannot be erased by an appeal to judicial independence.
The public statements of the Chief of Staff, the Aviation Minister, the FCT Minister and the President are equally part of the political record. They must be confronted, not explained away through abstract appeals to constitutionalism.
The Chief Judge deserves institutional fairness, but so do the litigants who complained about the circumstances of case assignment. Justice Lifu deserves the protection of judicial independence, but so does the public’s right to scrutinise his judicial conduct. The Presidency deserves the presumption that it has not committed an unproven offence, but it cannot demand immunity from political accountability for the statements and conduct of its senior officials.
And Atiku, David Mark and the ADC deserve the same protection of the law that would be demanded for any political party or presidential aspirant.
The most troubling feature of Ajulo’s intervention is that it treats every concern raised against the judicial and political establishment as an allegation requiring extraordinary proof, while treating every action taken by that establishment as presumptively legitimate.
That is not balance. It is asymmetry.
Festus Adedayo may not have established a judicially provable conspiracy involving the Presidency and Justice Lifu. But he has identified a series of developments that deserve serious public scrutiny. His concern is neither irrational nor without foundation.
The question is not whether we should abandon evidence in favour of political suspicion. It is whether we should abandon critical examination of evidence merely because it points in an uncomfortable direction.
That is the real meaning of intellectual honesty.
And if we must ask Àà tíí gbọ́?, let us ask the more important question: what should the world say when those entrusted with protecting democracy appear indifferent to the circumstances that threaten it?
A judiciary must not only dispense justice. It must inspire confidence that justice is being dispensed. And a Presidency must not only proclaim its commitment to democracy. It must conduct itself in a manner that leaves no reasonable doubt about that commitment.
That is the standard against which both Justice Lifu’s judgment and Ajulo’s defence must be measured.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD
DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE
