By Alex Ter Adum, PhD
THE DAVID MARK-LED ADC LEADERSHIP EMERGED THROUGH LEGAL DUE PROCESS: JUSTICE LIFU’S JUDGMENT AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
RE: FHC/ABJ/CS/1819/2025 – NAFIU BALA GOMBE v. ADC & ORS
The controversy surrounding the judgment delivered by Justice Peter Odo Lifu of the Federal High Court, Abuja, on 5 November 2026, raises fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation, judicial hierarchy, evaluation of evidence, fair hearing and the limits of consequential judicial orders.
Beyond the immediate contest for the leadership of the African Democratic Congress (ADC), a more consequential question arises: Can a trial court, while determining a leadership dispute remitted to it by the Supreme Court, invalidate the intervening actions of the party’s functioning national leadership and extinguish the electoral rights of candidates who subsequently emerged through party primaries without adequately considering the legal effect of the apex court’s intervention?
Our position is that these questions deserve rigorous appellate examination.
The Leadership Transition Was An Institutional Process, Not A Political Coup
The emergence of Senator David Mark as ADC National Chairman followed the departure of the former national leadership headed by Chief Ralph Nwosu.
Firstly, the entire National Working Committee reportedly tendered their resignations on 17 May 2025, including Nafiu Bala Gombe, then Deputy National Chairman. The ADC maintains that Bala’s resignation letter was received and accepted by the former National Chairman. Bala subsequently disputed its authenticity, alleging forgery.
Secondly, following the leadership vacuum, a stakeholders’ meeting was convened on 2 July 2025, at which Chief Ralph Nwosu handed over leadership responsibilities to Senator David Mark.
Thirdly, the transition was formalised at the National Executive Committee meeting of 29 July 2025, where David Mark emerged as National Chairman and Rauf Aregbesola as National Secretary, alongside other members of the new leadership.
Crucially, the ADC maintains that INEC received notice of the NEC meeting on 4 July 2025, 25 days before the meeting, exceeding the stipulated 21-day requirement. INEC reportedly confirmed in its counter-affidavit that it received the notice, deployed monitoring officials, received their report and subsequently recorded the leadership changes.
This documentary evidence was directly relevant to the legality of the transition. Justice Lifu ought to have evaluated it alongside Section 223 of the Constitution, the applicable Electoral Act and the ADC Constitution.
Automatic Succession Is Not A Constitutional Birthright
Nafiu Bala’s claim to automatic succession rests substantially on his former position as Deputy National Chairman.
But presiding over party affairs in the Chairman’s absence is not necessarily equivalent to inheriting the substantive office upon a permanent vacancy.
Article 17(4) of the published ADC Constitution provides a mechanism for filling vacancies through appointment by the appropriate Executive Committee, pending election at the next Congress or Convention. It does not expressly confer an unrestricted right of automatic succession upon a deputy.
Justice Lifu ought therefore to have examined the distinction between acting in the Chairman’s absence and succeeding to the substantive office, particularly against the relevant provisions of the party constitution.
Even if Bala establishes that his resignation was not genuine, that alone would not establish his entitlement to the substantive office. His succession claim must independently satisfy the ADC Constitution.
The Disputed Resignation: Evidence, Not Assumptions, Must Prevail
The allegation that Bala’s resignation letter was forged raises a serious evidential question.
The ADC considers the allegation an afterthought, particularly if the chronology and his earlier conduct support that conclusion. Nevertheless, the allegation must be resolved on evidence, not political characterisation.
According to published accounts, Justice Lifu examined Exhibit ADC-1 and compared the signature with signatures appearing on other court documents attributed to Bala before rejecting the resignation letter as sufficient proof.
The appellate question is whether that evaluation adequately addressed the totality of the available evidence.
Given the centrality of the document to Bala’s continued status as Deputy National Chairman and his succession claim, Justice Lifu ought to have considered the original document, its custody, the circumstances of its preparation, the evidence of its receipt and acceptance, and the reliability of the specimens used for comparison.
Where necessary, independent forensic examination or oral evidence could have assisted in resolving material conflicts.
Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, as amended, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt where the commission of a crime is directly in issue. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trade Bank Plc v. Pharmatek Industrial Projects Ltd (2020) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1725) 124 is relevant to the evidential treatment of allegations of fraud.
Importantly, a finding that the defendants failed to establish the authenticity of a document is not necessarily equivalent to a positive finding that someone committed criminal forgery.
The appellate court should determine whether the trial court sufficiently distinguished these questions and whether its evaluation was supported by legally admissible and reliable evidence.
The Abejide Judgment And The Duty To Consider Previous Judicial Proceedings
In Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1637/2025, Hon. Leke Abejide had earlier challenged the emergence of the David Mark-led leadership.
On 2 July 2026, Justice Musa Liman upheld preliminary objections concerning justiciability and the claimant’s standing.
Although Abejide’s claims and Bala’s claims were not identical in every respect, both proceedings substantially concerned the legality of the same leadership transition.
Justice Lifu ought to have given due consideration to the earlier proceedings, particularly their implications for judicial consistency, issue estoppel, abuse of court process and the jurisdictional boundaries of courts of coordinate authority.
The differences in the parties’ identities, asserted interests and reliefs might justify distinguishing the two proceedings. However, such distinction ought to have been expressly examined and judicially explained.
The relevant question is not simply whether the two cases were identical, but whether the earlier judicial determination had implications for issues subsequently presented before him.
The Supreme Court’s Intervention Of 30 April 2026: The Legal Effect Cannot Be Undone By A Lower Court
This is arguably the most significant constitutional dimension of the controversy.
On 30 April 2026, the Supreme Court intervened in the ADC leadership litigation, set aside the Court of Appeal’s preservatory order and remitted the substantive dispute to the Federal High Court for determination on its merits.
Although the apex court did not finally determine the substantive validity of Senator David Mark’s emergence as National Chairman, its decision had an immediate and important legal consequence: it removed the judicial restraint that had impeded his occupation and exercise of the office and provided the basis for INEC’s withdrawal of recognition of his leadership.
In other words, the Supreme Court did not finally pronounce on the merits of David Mark’s emergence, but neither did it leave in place the judicial impediment that had prevented him from functioning as National Chairman. The legal position following the apex court’s intervention was therefore materially different from the position created by the Court of Appeal’s earlier preservatory order.
This distinction is fundamental.
The Federal High Court was entitled to determine the substantive leadership dispute upon its remittal. However, it was required to do so within the legal framework established by the Supreme Court and with due regard to the legal consequences of the apex court’s intervention.
More importantly, the acts performed by the David Mark-led NWC while operating under that restored legal position could not simply be whimsically nullified or treated as legal non-events merely because the substantive leadership dispute remained pending.
Any challenge to those acts required a proper legal foundation. The court ought to have examined whether the legality, validity and regularity of the particular decisions, including the subsequent primary elections and nominations, had been substantively challenged, whether the relevant statutory and constitutional requirements had been breached, and whether the affected parties had been afforded fair hearing.
The mere pendency of a leadership dispute did not automatically suspend the institutional operations of the ADC, nor did it place every decision of the Mark-led NWC in a state of legal nullity.
Section 287(1) of the Constitution requires enforcement of Supreme Court decisions throughout the Federation. Consequently, the trial court was bound to give effect to the apex court’s decision and could not indirectly recreate the very judicial disability that had been removed without a proper legal basis.
The critical appellate question is therefore whether Justice Lifu, while exercising the jurisdiction remitted to him, sufficiently considered the legal effect of the Supreme Court’s intervention and whether his consequential orders were supported by an independent substantive determination of the validity or invalidity of the subsequent acts of the Mark-led NWC.
The authority to determine the leadership dispute did not confer an unrestricted power to extinguish every intervening institutional decision and electoral choice of the party.
A Leadership Dispute Cannot Automatically Extinguish Electoral Rights
Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the judgment is its reported extension to the nominations of Atiku Abubakar and other ADC candidates.
Atiku emerged through the party’s presidential direct primary of 25 May 2026. Other candidates similarly emerged through their respective primaries. They were not personally appointed by David Mark.
The legal status of an administrative organ and the validity of every electoral decision made under its administration are related but distinct questions.
Even if the Mark-led NWC were subsequently found to have suffered a legal disability, it does not automatically follow that every subsequent primary and nomination must collapse.
Justice Lifu ought to have separately examined whether the alleged defect in the NWC’s constitution necessarily invalidated the subsequent primaries, whether those primaries complied with the applicable Electoral Act and ADC Constitution, and whether the candidates’ independent legal interests were adequately represented.
Section 36 of the Constitution guarantees fair hearing. The court was required to consider whether the affected candidates were parties to the proceedings or otherwise afforded an opportunity to defend their interests.
Section 221 recognises the central role of political parties in sponsoring candidates. An NWC is an administrative organ; it is not the political party itself. The removal or disqualification of a party chairman does not dissolve the party or extinguish its legal personality.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Shinkafi v. Yari (2016) LPELR-26050(SC) and Tarzoor v. Ortom (2016) LPELR-26075(SC) provide relevant guidance on nomination disputes and the statutory framework governing party candidates.
The Court Of Appeal Must Restore Constitutional Clarity
The ADC should pursue a comprehensive appeal supported by the certified Supreme Court judgment of 30 April 2026, its enrolled orders, INEC’s sworn evidence, the NEC records and the original disputed resignation letter.
The appellate court should specifically determine whether Justice Lifu adequately considered the earlier Abejide proceedings, properly evaluated the disputed resignation, gave appropriate consideration to INEC’s deposition, respected the Supreme Court’s intervention and established sufficient legal grounds for the consequential orders affecting the party and its candidates.
Applications for appropriate preservatory relief and stay of execution should also be pursued. Filing an appeal does not automatically suspend execution, but the appellate court can grant protection where the applicable legal requirements are satisfied.
Conclusion: The Authority Of The Supreme Court Must Prevail, And Electoral Rights Must Be Protected
The emergence of the David Mark-led ADC leadership followed an identifiable institutional process involving the former leadership, stakeholders, the NEC and INEC.
Its legality must be judged by constitutional provisions and admissible evidence, not assumptions or political preferences.
Nafiu Bala’s automatic succession claim must be established by the ADC Constitution. His allegation of forgery must be resolved through legally sufficient evidence.
Justice Lifu’s judgment must equally be examined against the earlier proceedings before Justice Liman, the evidential significance of INEC’s sworn deposition and the binding legal framework established by the Supreme Court on 30 April 2026.
Although the apex court left the substantive leadership question open for determination, it removed the preservatory restraint that had impeded David Mark’s occupation and exercise of the office. The subsequent acts of the Mark-led NWC consequently required independent legal examination before they could be invalidated. The pendency of a leadership dispute was not, by itself, sufficient to render every intervening party decision and electoral activity void.
The fundamental appellate question is whether the learned trial judge sufficiently considered these matters before reaching his conclusions and making consequential orders.
The ultimate issue is bigger than the leadership ambitions of two individuals. It concerns the supremacy of the Constitution, the authority of the Supreme Court, the autonomy of political parties and the democratic rights of Nigerians who participate in party primaries.
THE SUPREME COURT HAD REMOVED THE JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENT. ITS DECISION COULD NOT BE RENDERED NUGATORY BY A LOWER COURT. AND THE ELECTORAL RIGHTS OF ADC MEMBERS CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED WITHOUT A CLEAR AND INDEPENDENT FOUNDATION IN LAW.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD
Lawyer | Public Affairs Commentator
