By Alex Ter Adum, PhD
In my considered opinion, the judgment of Hon. Justice Peter O. Lifu of the Federal High Court, Abuja, delivered on 5 November 2026, against Senator David Mark’s led NWC of the ADC, is seriously vulnerable on appeal. The proposed appeal by the African Democratic Congress (ADC), Senator David Mark and Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola raises substantial questions of jurisdiction, constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, evaluation of evidence and the limits of judicial intervention in the internal affairs of political parties. More importantly, the judgment appears to have departed from binding principles established by the Supreme Court of Nigeria.
I believe the ADC has a compelling appellate case, not merely because the trial Judge may have reached the wrong conclusions on some disputed facts, but because several of the conclusions upon which his judgment rests are legally questionable and, in some instances, internally contradictory.
The fundamental question of jurisdiction and the internal affairs of political parties
The strongest foundation of the appeal is the Supreme Court’s decision in Mutfwang Caleb Manasseh v. Dr. Nentawe Yilwatda Goshwe & Ors., SC/CV/1190/2023, delivered on 12 January 2024. In that decision, the Supreme Court examined the limits of judicial intervention in the internal affairs of political parties and drew an important distinction between disputes concerning the nomination of candidates for public elections and disputes relating to the constitution, composition and administration of party executive organs.
The Court’s reasoning, read alongside Aguma v. APC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1796) 351 and Osagie v. PDP (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1877) 355, provides a substantial basis for challenging Justice Lifu’s assumption of jurisdiction.
The ADC dispute is essentially about the reconstitution of its national executive organs, the exercise of powers by its National Executive Committee and the internal administration of the party. It is not a dispute over the nomination of a candidate for public election.
The distinction matters enormously. In Jegede v. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1797) 409, the Supreme Court dealt with electoral nomination and sponsorship. That jurisprudence cannot be indiscriminately extended to confer jurisdiction over every disagreement concerning the internal administration of a political party.
The Court of Appeal must therefore examine whether Justice Lifu properly identified the legal basis for entertaining the dispute or whether he exercised judicial authority over a matter which, in its essential character, belonged to the internal administration of the ADC.
The general jurisdictional principles in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 are equally relevant: a court must be competent, properly constituted and vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter before it can validly adjudicate. Jurisdiction cannot be created by the parties’ pleadings or by the manner in which a claimant describes his grievance.
Section 82 of the Electoral Act 2022 did not automatically confer jurisdiction
A second fundamental weakness is the apparent reliance on section 82 of the Electoral Act 2022 as a sufficient basis for judicial intervention.
The mere citation of a statutory provision does not establish that a claimant has a legally enforceable cause of action under that provision. The court must identify the particular statutory obligation allegedly breached, determine whether the complaint falls within the provision and establish whether the claimant is legally entitled to seek the reliefs claimed.
The trial Judge was therefore required to distinguish between statutory obligations imposed on political parties and the separate question of whether the 1st Respondent could invoke those obligations to challenge the internal reorganisation of the ADC.
The Appellants’ argument would be that the court failed to identify the precise statutory foundation for the proceedings and effectively expanded section 82 beyond its proper scope.
This is not a technical objection. It goes to the very foundation of the court’s authority to entertain the dispute.
The failure to distinguish an election of party officers from an interim administrative arrangement
One of the most important factual and legal questions is the true character of the 99th NEC meeting held on 29 July 2025.
Was the meeting convened to conduct an election of substantive party officers, or was it convened to exercise the NEC’s constitutional powers concerning the reorganisation and interim administration of the party as provided under Article 19(14) of the ADC constitution?
These are legally distinct exercises.
Section 223 of the 1999 Constitution requires political parties to provide for periodic elections of members of their executive committees and governing bodies. It does not follow, however, that every interim administrative arrangement or caretaker committee is automatically unconstitutional.
The constitutional provision must be interpreted alongside section 228 and the relevant provisions of the ADC Constitution 2022, particularly Article 19(14), which the ADC relied upon as the constitutional foundation for the NEC’s administrative powers.
The Judge was required to examine the actual business conducted at the meeting, the powers conferred on the NEC and the conditions governing their exercise. He could not simply assume that the meeting was an election of substantive officers and apply statutory requirements on that basis.
The distinction is central to this appeal because the legal consequences of an election of substantive party officers conducted in breach of statutory requirements are fundamentally different from those of an interim administrative arrangement established pursuant to the constitution of a political party. This is not merely an academic distinction; it is a principle that has received express judicial recognition in the affairs of the APC, PDP and Labour Party.
In Aguma v. APC & Ors. (2021), SC.17/2021, delivered on 5 March 2021, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional authority of the APC National Working Committee to dissolve an existing executive structure and establish a caretaker committee under the party’s constitution. Justice Emmanuel Agim JSC expressly recognised that the composition of an elected State Executive Committee is not necessarily the same as that of a caretaker committee and that the National Working Committee could directly determine the interim administration of the party through such an arrangement.
Even more compelling is the Supreme Court’s decision in PDP v. Senator Ali Modu Sheriff & Ors. (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1588) 219, where the Court expressly upheld the dissolution of the PDP’s National Executive Committee and National Working Committee and the appointment of a National Caretaker Committee by the National Convention pursuant to Articles 33(5)(b) and 33(5)(e) of the PDP Constitution. The Supreme Court held unequivocally that the Convention had acted constitutionally in taking those decisions.
The Labour Party provides a more recent illustration. In Sen. Esther Nenadi Usman & Anor. v. Labour Party & INEC, SC/CV/56/2025, delivered on 4 April 2025, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the limits of judicial intervention in internal party leadership disputes. Subsequently, in Abure v. Usman & Ors., Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/255/2026, delivered on 21 April 2026, the Court of Appeal affirmed the recognition of the Nenadi Usman-led Caretaker Committee as the interim leadership of the Labour Party pending its national convention.
These decisions establish an important principle: the law does not equate an interim caretaker arrangement with an election of substantive party officers. Where a party constitution empowers a competent organ to establish an interim administrative structure, the existence and exercise of that power must be examined on their own legal merits. It is therefore erroneous to invalidate an administrative reorganisation merely by importing statutory requirements applicable to the election of substantive officers, without first determining the actual nature of the exercise and the constitutional authority under which it was undertaken.
That is precisely the question Justice Lifu was required to determine before invalidating the ADC’s 99th NEC meeting of 29 July 2025.
The Electoral Act 2026 and the amendment of the originating process
Another important issue which is not very clear to me from the judgment that deserves the attention of the Court of Appeal is the amendment of Nafiu Bala Gombe’s originating process on 24 July 2026, several months after the Electoral Act 2026 had come into force on 18 February 2026. The original action was commenced on 2 September 2025, when the Electoral Act 2022 was still applicable. The critical question, therefore, is not simply whether a court has the general power to permit amendments, but whether that power could properly be exercised to alter the essential character of an existing dispute in order to escape the jurisdictional restriction subsequently introduced by section 83(5) of the Electoral Act 2026.
The distinction is fundamental. An amendment which merely clarifies the original cause of action, supplies further particulars or corrects an error without changing the substance of the claim is one thing. An amendment which materially reconstructs the cause of action, introduces a different factual or legal foundation, or recasts an internal party dispute as something supposedly outside the internal affairs of the political party is an entirely different matter. The latter cannot be justified merely by invoking the court’s general power to amend pleadings.
The Supreme Court addressed the proper limits of amendment in Jessica Trading Co. Ltd. v. Bendel Insurance Co. Ltd. (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 271) 538, emphasising that the object of amendment is to enable the court determine the real controversy between the parties, not to permit a party to substitute a fundamentally different claim. In Akaninwo v. Nsirim (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439, the Supreme Court further identified the nature of the proposed amendment, the controversy before the court and the time at which the amendment was sought as relevant considerations in the exercise of judicial discretion. The Court of Appeal was even more explicit in Abdullahi Adamu v. Mumkaila Isa (2014) LCN/7219(CA), where it warned against amendments calculated to change the nature of a case or overreach the opposing party.
These principles assume particular significance in the present proceedings. By 24 July 2026, section 83(5) of the Electoral Act 2026 had already introduced a statutory restriction on judicial intervention in matters pertaining to the internal affairs of political parties, subject to the qualification in subsection (3). If the Respondent’s amendment was intended merely to clarify the original allegations, it could be considered on that limited basis. But if its purpose or effect was to recast the original dispute in order to suggest that it had ceased to concern the internal affairs of the ADC, the learned trial Judge was required to confront that issue before granting leave. A party cannot be permitted to achieve by amendment what the law would otherwise prohibit by disguising the true nature of the controversy.
The question was therefore whether the amended process remained substantially the same action commenced in September 2025 or whether it introduced a materially different claim after the commencement of the 2026 Act. That inquiry was indispensable. The court could not properly grant leave without examining the original and amended processes side by side, identifying the changes introduced and determining their legal consequences by simply saying the Appellants had a right of reply.
This issue must also be considered alongside section 6 of the Interpretation Act and the repeal and saving provisions of the Electoral Act 2026. The fact that the original proceedings were commenced under the 2022 Act does not automatically resolve the effect of the subsequent amendment. Equally, the commencement of the 2026 Act does not, without proper statutory analysis, automatically extinguish every proceeding already pending. The court was required to distinguish the original cause of action and any rights or remedies preserved by the saving provisions from any materially new claim introduced after the new Act had commenced.
The central complaint, therefore, is not that the Respondent had no right to seek an amendment. It is that the learned trial Judge failed to determine whether the particular amendment was genuinely clarificatory or was an attempt to alter the essential character of the proceedings to avoid the operation of section 83(5). That failure raises a substantial question about the proper exercise of judicial discretion and the jurisdictional consequences of the amendment. The Court of Appeal should not overlook it.
The contradiction in the findings concerning INEC’s notice
Perhaps one of the most demonstrable errors in the judgment concerns the notice given to INEC.
At page 57 of the judgment, Judge Lifu expressly acknowledged that INEC received 25 days’ notice of the 99th NEC meeting and monitored the proceedings.
Yet, at page 65, in Declaration No. 3, he declared INEC’s attendance, report and recognition wrongful and null, relying, among other things, on the alleged absence of requisite notice.
How can a court acknowledge that the statutory institution received 25 days’ notice and participated in monitoring the meeting, but subsequently invalidate its participation on the basis of inadequate notice without explaining the specific deficiency?
The Judge was required to identify the precise statutory particulars allegedly omitted from the notice and explain why the notice received was insufficient under section 82(1) of the Electoral Act 2022.
He was also required to distinguish between the notice requirement and the separate question of whether the meeting involved an election requiring compliance with democratic election procedures.
A court cannot ignore a material finding in its own judgment when arriving at its ultimate conclusion. This contradiction is particularly important because it directly affected the declarations made against INEC and the ADC.
The improper evaluation of Exhibit ADC 1 and the alleged resignation
One of the more fundamental questions arising from the judgment concerns not merely the trial court’s conclusion that Exhibit ADC 1, the resignation letter attributed to Nafiu Bala Gombe and dated 17 May 2025, was fictitious or fabricated, but whether the proceedings were commenced by the appropriate judicial process for determining such a controversy in the first place.
The authenticity of Exhibit ADC 1 was not simply a question of interpreting the contents of a document. It involved a disputed question of fact: whether the signature appearing on the document was genuinely made by Nafiu Bala Gombe. Once that signature was challenged, its authenticity could not properly be assumed. It required an evidential foundation. The court had to determine whether the signatures selected for comparison were themselves genuine, whether the comparison was reliable, and whether the surrounding circumstances supported or contradicted the alleged execution of the resignation letter.
This raises a serious procedural question. An originating summons is principally designed for the determination of questions of law, interpretation of statutes and construction of documents in circumstances where the material facts are not substantially disputed. It is not ordinarily the appropriate vehicle for resolving hostile proceedings involving contested facts that require the calling of witnesses, the production of evidence and cross-examination.
The Supreme Court made this position unmistakably clear in Sylvanus Eze v. University of Jos (2017), SC.428/2013(R), delivered on 5 May 2017. In that decision, Rhodes-Vivour JSC explained that originating summons proceedings dispense with pleadings and that affidavits take the place of pleadings. His Lordship stated that originating summons is unsuitable for hostile proceedings where facts are seriously disputed. Significantly, the Supreme Court held that where an action commenced by originating summons becomes contentious, or it becomes obvious that material facts are in dispute, a writ of summons should be ordered.
The principle is equally clear in Oba Adegboyega Osunbade v. Oba Jimoh Oyewunmi (2007) 4–5 SC 98; SC.79/2002, delivered on 3 May 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed that originating summons is not suitable for hostile proceedings where the facts are in dispute. The procedure is intended for questions of interpretation of statutes, contracts, documents, etc, that can properly be resolved without the need to settle contested factual issues through pleadings and oral evidence.
Earlier, in National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Lady Alakija (1978) 9–10 SC 59, the Supreme Court had stated that originating summons should be employed only where there is no dispute on questions of fact or even the likelihood of such a dispute. It warned that the procedure must not become a substitute for the ordinary process of commencing contentious proceedings. The same concern was expressed in Doherty v. Doherty (1968) NMLR 241 , where the Supreme Court cautioned against employing originating summons in hostile proceedings, particularly where the facts are disputed.
Perhaps even more instructive is Ossai v. Wakwah & Ors. (2006) 2 SC (Pt. I) 19; [2006] NGSC 17. The Supreme Court emphasised that the suitability of originating summons must be determined by the nature of the controversy and the evidence required to resolve it. It further explained that it is not merely the filing of a counter-affidavit that makes proceedings contentious. The nature of the claims and the facts disclosed in the supporting affidavit may themselves reveal that the dispute is hostile and requires the ordinary process of pleadings and trial. The Court upheld the setting aside of proceedings improperly commenced by originating summons and the direction that the matter be heard afresh on pleadings.
These authorities have direct relevance to the controversy surrounding Exhibit ADC 1. Once the authenticity of Nafiu Bala Gombe’s alleged signature became a material and contested issue, the court was confronted with more than a question of documentary interpretation. It was required to determine a disputed fact upon which the legal consequences of the alleged resignation depended.
Section 101(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 permits comparison of a disputed signature with another writing only where the latter has been admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been made by the person alleged to have made it. Thus, the court could not simply select other signatures attributed to Nafiu Bala Gombe, assume their authenticity and proceed to use them as the standard for declaring Exhibit ADC 1 fabricated. The genuineness of the comparison material itself required proof.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Enwerem v. Abubakar & Anor. [2016] NGCA 56 reinforces the requirement that comparison material must first be established as genuine. Similarly, in Ezeonwu v. Onyechi (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 499 at 528 , the Supreme Court warned that mere dissimilarity in signatures is neither conclusive evidence nor a rational basis for concluding that the signatures were not made by the same person.
The difficulty, therefore, is not confined to whether the trial Judge correctly compared the signatures. It extends to whether the chosen procedure was capable of fairly resolving the underlying factual controversy. If determining the authenticity of Exhibit ADC 1 required evidence from persons familiar with Nafiu Bala Gombe’s handwriting, evidence from persons involved in preparing or transmitting the document, examination of the circumstances of its execution, or expert handwriting evidence followed by cross-examination, the dispute had assumed the character of hostile proceedings for which originating summons was unsuitable.
Exhibit ADC 2, the accompanying correspondence, and the circumstances surrounding the preparation, transmission and receipt of Exhibit ADC 1 were also relevant. Their significance could not properly be determined by isolating the disputed signature and making a visual assessment of it. The totality of the evidence required evaluation.
The Court of Appeal would therefore be invited to consider whether the trial court ought, at the outset, to have recognised that the controversy over the authenticity of Exhibit ADC 1 raised substantial disputed questions of fact which could not fairly be resolved through affidavit evidence alone. In the circumstances, the appropriate course would have been to direct that the matter proceed by writ of summons, with pleadings, witnesses and the opportunity for cross-examination, rather than determine the contested authenticity of the document through the abbreviated originating summons procedure.
This is not to suggest that every conflict in affidavit evidence automatically invalidates proceedings commenced by originating summons. The decisive consideration is whether the nature and importance of the disputed facts make the procedure unsuitable for a fair determination. On the available description of the controversy surrounding Exhibit ADC 1, the authenticity of the signature was central, not incidental, to the dispute.
The significance of this argument is considerable. If the Court of Appeal finds that the proceedings involved substantial and hostile factual disputes which ought to have been tried on pleadings and oral evidence, it would have a separate procedural basis for questioning the judgment, quite apart from whether the trial Judge correctly evaluated the evidence of forgery. The complaint would then be that the trial court adopted an inappropriate procedure to determine a controversy which, by its very nature, required a full trial on the disputed facts.
The Judge’s conclusion that the document was fabricated would therefore raise a serious question of whether the finding was supported by the evidence as a whole.
The unlawful elevation of Nafiu Bala Gombe into supervisory authority over the ADC
Even if, for the sake of argument, the 99th NEC meeting were invalid, it does not also follow that Nafiu Bala Gombe automatically became entitled to supervise the affairs of the entire ADC.
These are two different legal questions.
The invalidation of an administrative arrangement does not automatically establish the constitutional entitlement of another individual to assume the administration of a political party.
The Judge was required to determine the 1st Respondent’s actual status, the effect of his alleged resignation and the applicable provisions governing vacancies, replacement and succession.
Articles 17(4), 19(12), 22(12)(3), 22(13) and 23(4) of the ADC Constitution are relevant to the proper determination of the respective powers of the NEC, NWC and the mechanisms for dealing with vacancies and succession.
The distinction between membership of a party executive organ and entitlement to exercise the powers of that organ is fundamental.
The court could not simply declare Nafiu Bala Gombe the only elected NWC member entitled to supervise the entire party without identifying the specific constitutional provision vesting that authority in him.
That consequential order was not an automatic legal consequence of invalidating the 99th NEC meeting. It required an independent legal and evidential foundation.
Judge Lifu’s failure to give effect to Justice Liman’s earlier judgment
Perhaps equally consequential is the judgment delivered by Hon. Judge Musa Liman on 2 July 2026 in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1637/2025. Its significance cannot be dismissed merely on the argument that the existence of that judgment was not brought to the attention of Hon. Judge Peter Lifu during the proceedings before him.
For the avoidance of doubt, I do not suggest that Justice Lifu deliberately disregarded a judgment that was never brought to his attention. Nor is it necessary to attribute any improper motive to him. The more fundamental question is whether the subsequent judgment can withstand appellate scrutiny when examined against the existence and legal consequences of the earlier judicial determination.
The distinction is important. A judge cannot reasonably be criticised for failing to discuss a judgment that was not presented to him. But that circumstance cannot confer upon his judgment an immunity from examination by an appellate court, nor can it extinguish the legal consequences which an earlier subsisting judgment may have for the determination of the controversy.
The principles of res judicata, issue estoppel and the limits of coordinate jurisdiction are not dependent upon the personal knowledge of a subsequent judge. They concern the legal effect of judicial determinations and the limits of judicial authority.
In Cole v. Jibunoh and Others (2016) NGSC 78 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction binds the parties and their privies in respect of matters conclusively determined. The Court equally recognised that courts of coordinate jurisdiction cannot exercise appellate authority over the decisions of one another.
The principles in Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. Attorney-General of Lagos State (No. 1) (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 112) 707, Ajomale v. Yaduat (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 266 and Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 64) 129 reinforce the importance of finality in judicial determinations and the limits of subsequent proceedings.
The relevance of these principles becomes particularly apparent when one considers the recent decision of Hon. Judge Inyang Ekwo of the same Federal High Court in the Action Alliance leadership dispute. On 10 November 2026, Judge Ekwo declined to entertain proceedings which, in his view, would require a coordinate court of the Federal High Court to revisit matters already determined by another Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal in the Action Alliance leadership dispute.
Although that case involved an existing appellate judgment and is therefore distinguishable from the ADC situation, its underlying jurisprudential lesson is instructive: a court cannot assume the jurisdiction to reopen or contradict a binding judicial determination merely because a subsequent litigant presents the controversy under a different formulation with different parties or seeks different consequential reliefs.
The same principle demands serious consideration in the ADC case.
On 2 July 2026, Judge Liman delivered judgment in the dispute instituted by Hon. Leke Abejide, which concerned, among other things, the legality of the transition of leadership from Chief Ralph Nwosu to Senator David Mark and Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola, and the recognition of that leadership by INEC.
Judge Lifu subsequently determined the leadership controversy in proceedings instituted by Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe. The fact that the two proceedings had different claimants, different formulations of reliefs and potentially different causes of action does not, without more, answer the question whether issues conclusively determined in the earlier proceedings were reopened in the later ones.
That is precisely the question which the appellate court must examine.
Were the parties or their privies sufficiently identical in law? Were the issues directly and substantially the same? Did Judge Liman determine those issues in the exercise of competent jurisdiction? Were his relevant findings necessary to the judgment or merely incidental observations? What were the precise terms and legal effect of his operative orders?
These are questions that must be answered from the certified record, not from newspaper reports or competing interpretations of the two judgments.
There is, therefore, no need to accuse Judge Lifu of consciously sitting on appeal over Judge Liman. The more compelling submission is that the Court of Appeal must determine whether the subsequent judgment, when measured against the earlier subsisting judgment, has produced an outcome that the law permits a court of coordinate jurisdiction to reach.
If the requirements of res judicata or issue or subject matter estoppel are established, or if the subsequent proceedings amounted to an impermissible invitation to a court of coordinate jurisdiction to reverse an existing judicial determination, the consequences cannot be avoided merely because the earlier judgment was not specifically drawn to the trial judge’s attention.
The absence of such notice may explain the course taken at trial. It cannot, however, settle the question of the legal validity of the resulting judgment.
Ultimately, the appeal should not be reduced to an accusation that one judge disregarded another. It should be resolved by examining whether the judicial system has permitted a controversy already conclusively determined to be reopened before a court of equal jurisdiction, thereby exposing the parties, the institution and the public to inconsistent judicial determinations.
The authority of the courts depends not merely on the ability to deliver judgments, but also on the certainty, consistency and finality which the law requires those judgments to command.
The excessive consequential orders
The final and equally fundamental weakness of the judgment in my humble opinion concerns the extraordinary breadth and retrospective effect of the reliefs granted by the learned trial Judge.
Judge Lifu did not merely declare the 99th National Executive Committee meeting invalid. He proceeded to nullify acts performed by the national officers from 29 July 2025, direct INEC to recognise Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe as the only elected NWC member entitled to supervise the affairs of the party, and grant perpetual injunctions restraining the Appellants and other persons from participating in the administration of the African Democratic Congress.
Each of these orders raised distinct questions of law and required independent justification.
First, the burden of establishing entitlement to declaratory relief rests squarely on the claimant. Sections 131(1), 132, 133(1), 134 and 136(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 place that burden upon the party asserting the existence of the legal rights upon which the declaration depends. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a claimant seeking declaratory relief must succeed on the strength of his own case and credible evidence, not on the weakness of the defence or admissions in the pleadings.
See Vincent Bello v. Magnus Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101 at 182; Sorungbe v. Omotunwase (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 7 SC (Pt. III) 164; and Osho v. Adeleye (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1941) 431.
Consequently, the declaration recognising Nafiu Bala Gombe as the only elected NWC member entitled to supervise the affairs of the ADC could not properly be granted merely as an administrative consequence of invalidating the 99th NEC meeting. His independent entitlement to that status and authority had to be established by credible evidence and the applicable provisions of the party’s constitution.
Secondly, the learned trial Judge was required to distinguish between the validity of the particular NEC meeting and the legal consequences of acts subsequently performed by national officers who exercised authority under colour of their recognised positions especially in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision of 30 April 2026.
This distinction is supported by the Supreme Court’s consideration of the de facto officer doctrine in Brig. Gen. Mohammed Buba Marwa & Ors. v. Admiral Murtala Nyako & Ors. (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199.
In that decision, the Supreme Court recognised that official acts performed by persons exercising de facto authority within the scope of their assumed official functions, in the interest of the public or innocent third parties, are generally preserved notwithstanding a subsequent determination that their title to office was defective.
The rationale is founded on public policy, legal certainty and the avoidance of administrative chaos. The law does not ordinarily permit the retrospective destruction of every transaction and administrative act undertaken in reliance upon apparent official authority.
The Supreme Court also referred to Balonwu v. Governor of Anambra State (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 13 and the authorities of Agidigbi v. Agidigbi (1996) 6 SCBJ 105 and Sanyinna v. African International Bank Plc (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 703) 353.
Similarly, in Adefulu & Ors. v. Okulaja & Ors. (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) 668 , the Supreme Court recognised the possible application of the doctrine of necessity or implied mandate to preserve certain acts performed by a person exercising de facto control of an office, although it did not finally determine that question in that appeal.
These authorities raise an important question which the learned trial Judge ought to have addressed: even if the 99th NEC meeting was invalid, did that determination necessarily render every subsequent administrative act performed by the national officers invalid?
The answer could not properly be assumed. It required an examination of the nature of each category of act, the authority under which it was performed, the persons who relied upon it and the consequences of retrospectively invalidating it.
The Appellants would not contend that the doctrine of de facto authority can validate an otherwise invalid NEC meeting or cure an unlawful appointment. The submission is narrower: the invalidation of an antecedent leadership process does not automatically extinguish every intervening administrative act, particularly those undertaken for the benefit of the party, its members or innocent third parties who relied upon the apparent authority of the officers.
The court was therefore required to distinguish between the validity of the officers’ title and the legal consequences of their intervening acts.
Thirdly, the law does not permit a court to grant reliefs beyond the claims established before it. In Ekpenyong & Ors. v. Nyong & Ors. (1975) 2 SC 71 at 80–81, the Supreme Court held that a court may grant less than what is claimed but cannot grant more or award reliefs not sought.
See also Ezeonwu v. Onyechi (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 499 and Attorney-General of the Federation v. A.I.C. Ltd. (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 293.
Although Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227 recognises the power of a court to make consequential orders, such orders must flow naturally and directly from the judgment and must give effect to the rights actually established. They cannot be used to introduce extraneous matters or create a new substantive case.
The question, therefore, is whether the blanket invalidation of every act performed by the national officers from 29 July 2025, together with the transfer of supervisory authority to the claimant, was truly necessary to give effect to the declaration concerning the 99th NEC meeting, or whether the learned trial Judge thereby enlarged the scope of the litigation and granted reliefs whose independent legal foundations had not been established.
Fourthly, the perpetual injunctions raise an additional question of fair hearing and the rights of persons who were not parties to the proceedings.
In Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480, the Supreme Court explained the importance of joining persons whose presence is necessary for the effective and complete determination of the questions in controversy.
In Oyeyemi v. Owoeye (2017) LPELR-41903(SC), the Supreme Court addressed the effect of orders made against persons who were not parties to the proceedings. See also Azuh v. UBN Plc (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1419) 580 and Cotecna International Ltd. v. Churchgate Nigeria Ltd. (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 346.
The learned trial Judge could not properly impose restraints affecting the administrative rights and responsibilities of persons who had not been afforded the opportunity to be heard, merely by employing a general injunction against the Appellants and other persons.
In Mohammed v. Olawunmi (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 384, the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of identifying and properly defining the subject matter of injunctive relief. An injunction must be sufficiently precise to identify the rights protected and the extent of the restraint imposed.
A perpetual injunction cannot become an instrument for imposing an indefinite administrative arrangement upon a political party beyond the rights established and the parties properly before the court.
The Court of Appeal would therefore be invited to examine each of these consequential orders independently and determine whether the learned trial Judge established the necessary legal foundation for their grant.
The invalidation of a meeting is not synonymous with the retrospective invalidation of every subsequent administrative act. The invalidation of a leadership process does not, without more, establish another person’s exclusive entitlement to administer the party. Nor does it automatically confer jurisdiction to restrain every other person from participating in the party’s administration.
The learned trial Judge was required to demonstrate the legal necessity, evidential foundation and proper scope of each order. In the absence of such justification, the sweeping retrospective nullification and perpetual injunctions cannot be sustained.
The Appellants would accordingly be submitting that the Court of Appeal should set aside the orders extending beyond the properly established rights and issues before the trial court.
CONCLUSION: A SUBSTANTIAL CASE FOR REVERSAL
In my assessment, the ADC’s appeal would be considerably stronger than an ordinary appeal founded on disagreement with a trial Judge’s evaluation of evidence.
It would raise fundamental questions about the jurisdiction of courts over internal party affairs, the binding authority of Supreme Court decisions, the interpretation of electoral legislation, the constitutional powers of party organs, the evaluation of disputed documentary evidence and the limits of consequential judicial orders.
The most compelling feature is the cumulative effect of these errors. Even if the Court of Appeal were not persuaded by every ground, the jurisdictional question, the failure to properly characterise the 99th NEC meeting, the contradictory findings on INEC’s notice and the failure to establish Nafiu Bala Gombe’s independent entitlement to supervise the party provide substantial grounds for appellate intervention.
The appeal should therefore seek not merely to reverse isolated findings but to set aside the judgment and its consequential orders and, on the merits of the established record, dismiss the 1st Respondent’s claims.
I am particularly persuaded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mutfwang provides the ADC with a powerful legal foundation. A lower court cannot disregard the binding jurisprudence of the apex court simply because a claimant has framed an internal party dispute as a statutory complaint.
The Court of Appeal has both the authority and the responsibility to ensure that the Federal High Court remains within the constitutional and statutory limits of its jurisdiction.
The ultimate principle is simple: political parties must obey their constitutions and the laws of Nigeria, but judges must equally obey the Constitution, statutes and binding decisions of the Supreme Court. Judicial intervention must never become judicial administration of a political party.
The ADC has a substantial case for reversal, and I believe the Court of Appeal has compelling legal grounds upon which to set aside Judge Lifu’s judgment.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD
DDG THE NARRATIVE FORCE
